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Abstract In their joint contribution, the president of the German Association for
English Studies (Deutscher Anglistenverband), Klaus Stierstorfer, and the presi-
dent of the German Association for American Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Amerikastudien), Peter Schneck, describe the central motivations behind the deci-
sion to actively support the pilot study for the research rating of the German Council
of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) despite some fundamental skepticism
among the associations’s members. On the basis of five basic propositions—different
in each argument—they both insist that the assessment of research quality in the
humanities inevitably requires the central involvement of the disciplines assessed in
order to reflect on and formulate the central categories, standards and procedures best
suited for such assessments. Such a process must take into account the complexity
of research processes and results in the humanities whose qualitative dimensions
cannot be fully measured by quantitative methods.
1 Rating Research: Who Needs It, and What Is It Good
For? (by Klaus Stiersdorfer)
Research rating and ranking is happening now, at least in German academia in my
experience, and it has been growing in the anglophone countries, with which I deal
professionally, at an alarming pace and as a kind of menetekel for whatever other
countries may be planning to do in the future. This is why, and here is my first thesis,
research rating and ranking cannot be avoided at present. If my first thesis is accepted,
then it is worth exploring what it looks like at present in the humanities.
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Most rating and ranking systems I have come across involve any one of the
following procedures: peer reviewing of research publications; measuring of quanti-
ties of publications; opinion polls on the research reputations of individual institutions
and agencies, or any combination of the three. I will not dwell on the latter two as
they seem the most obviously inadequate for rating in the humanities, but do want
to broach briefly the topic of peer reviewing which is widely seen as the fairest and
most reliable tool of the three. The problems I see with it in its current form have,
however, to do with fairness and transparency. With most reviewing procedures, the
image of the administration of justice attributed to the so-called dark middle ages
seems appropriate. There is little transparency in the application of pre-specified
criteria; the actual judges (peer-reviewers) are still shielded from the person under
review (the defendant) by the inquisitorial screen of anonymity; and the defendant
has hardly any means of recourse to plead his or her case when the verdict is negative.
This leads to a situation when most researchers in my field, at least where they have
the choice, avoid such reviewing processes as the impression (true or not) arising
from this black-box juridical system is imputations of favouritism, nepotism and the
pursuit of non-scholarly, strategic or political ends under cover of this anonymity.
The much-propounded ‘blind’ or even ‘double blind’ peer-review really does not
mean that justice is iconically blind (as she should be) as to the addressee of her
ministrations (projects under review are all too easily attributable in small research
communities), but that reviewees are blinded (as they should not be) as to who is
their judge and on what grounds their verdict is really passed. Hence, on this ground
and many others, my second thesis is, current research rating needs improvement if
we want to stick to this practice.
How such improvement can be brought about is, of course, the philosopher’s
stone here, but before its quest is started, the issue of the necessity of rating research
in the humanities in the first place must be dealt with. As this is a short statement,
the answer suggested here—which is also the prevalent opinion in the Deutscher
Anglistenverband and the official position of its presidency and council—is essen-
tially twofold. First, and this is my thesis number three, we need research rating
because it is there or, more precisely, scholars in the humanities and their soci-
eties and associations should get involved in research rating because they are being
practiced at the moment; trying to make oneself heard and get involved in estab-
lishing the fairest and best practice possible seems reasonable if not logical and
unavoidable. Experience has shown that outright refusal to join the discussion does
not help to avoid rating and ranking but produces bad, because inexpertly designed
procedures.
Why then has research rating been established in the first place? The simple
answer is: money. In the progressive commercialization and economization (if that
is a word) of our academia, the political focus on money invested in research has
been immense, and hence a mechanism for its distribution was sorely needed. On
a simple, outcome-oriented economic model, the logical system is to put money
where the best outcome is. Hence the idea to measure research outcomes and put
most money where the best outcomes can be registered or at least expected. Thus,
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research rating is primarily an administrative tool that has to do with investing and
distributing limited funds for research. The crux of defining and comparing precisely
these outcomes has long been overlooked or neglected. In the most negative reading,
the whole process only shifts the problem to another scenario.
Does rating have any benefits for the scholar or researcher in the humanities? My
answer is: No, surely not primarily. In a slightly more personal explanation I would
stress that I am not interested in knowing whether my colleague X’s new monograph
is better than mine, and if so how much on a scale from 1 to 10, neither do I need to
know whether colleague Y’s article in a field I am interested in is rated high or low
before I read it as the specific questions I bring to it in my specific research context
may differ from quality criteria, nor do I have any desire to be informed whether my
publications of the last 5 years are to be graded as 5, 6 or 7 on a scale of 1–10. For
purposes of orientation which books and articles to look at in the first place, I have
sufficient bibliographic and reviewing tools at hand which are well-established and
efficient, even if not easily translatable onto scales from 1 to 10. Thus, my thesis
number four says research rating is next to useless for the purposes of research itself
and time spent on it would be immeasurably better spent on such research.
But, if we cannot reasonably avoid research rating at present, and even if it seems
pointless for research, can we gather some lateral benefits from it, although it remains
primarily superfluous in the eyes of the researcher? Here my fifth thesis is yes,
research rating could be devised in such ways that a number of collateral benefits
might accrue. Again, a lot of creative thinking could and must go into this question,
but I only want to focus on one possible aspect here, that is disciplinary self-reflection.
By thinking about criteria how quality of research can be measured and understood,
scholars in the humanities will be forced to reflect on their current standards and aims
of research and how to define them. This process can help individual disciplines to
identify where they stand as a discipline and where they might want to be going in the
future, as the steering function of rating procedures can hardly be underestimated.
While rating may thus be a good thing for initiating and furthering discussions in
disciplines and professional associations such as our Anglistenverband, this does
not mean that these guidelines agreed on for the entire discipline are really a good
yardstick for individual instances of research. Especially in the humanities we know
too well that innovative research is, as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and others
have argued, all too often not the kind that is immediately recognizable as such by
current disciplinary standards.
Conclusion: Although the benefits seem lateral at best, rating of research is nothing
that the humanities can easily avoid at the moment, so it seems better to embrace
the discussion leading to its implementation with full commitment in the service of
the colleagues for whom we speak in our various associations. The search for a fair,
transparent and equitable rating system in the humanities may be a quest for the
philosopher’s stone, but that does not mean that, under current circumstances, we
should not try as best we can.
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Thesis 1: Research rating and ranking cannot be avoided at present.
Thesis 2: Research rating and ranking needs improvement if it is to be continued.
Thesis 3: Research rating and ranking is needed because it is there.
Thesis 4: Research rating and ranking is useless for research itself.
Thesis 5: Research rating and ranking can produce collateral benefits.
2 ‘Weighing the Soul’ of the Humanities (by Peter Schneck)
Let me begin with a little historical anecdote: On April 10th 1901, Dr. Duncan
MacDougall, a medical researcher from Dorchester, Massachusetts conducted an
experiment to determine the physical existence of the soul. Placing six moribund
patients on specially designed scales, the doctor tried to quantify the soul by mea-
suring the weight of the patient’s bodies shortly before and shortly after their death.
Comparing the difference between the two assessments, MacDougall found that each
of the patient’s bodies lost precisely the same amount of weight, which was around
three-fourth of an ounce, or about 21 g. Since he could think of no other explanation
for the difference in weight, the doctor concluded that in the moment of death the
soul had left the patient’s body; thus the soul not only existed, it’s weight could also
be pinned down rather precisely at 21 g—which is probably less than one would
have expected for such a ‘weighty’ phenomena as the soul given its metaphysical
significance throughout our cultural and spiritual history.
While MacDougall’s weighing of the soul may be regarded as one of the count-
less, equally eccentric and futile attempts to measure the immeasurable—an attempt
which is symptomatic for a climate of extreme scientific optimism and positivism
around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century—it may nevertheless be instructive
for understanding the current struggle between those who propose to assess, rate or
quantify the quality of research in the humanities with objective methods of weighing
and measurement, and those who think that this attempt would amount to a futile
‘weighing of the soul’—that is, an absurd, useless and basically misguided exercise.
The anecdote may be instructive in the context of our discussion for more than
one reason, but before I turn to the problem of measuring the immeasurable in the
main part of my short remarks, let me clarify a few things from the start.
On the one hand, I am talking to you as a humanities scholar whose teaching and
research has been subjected to various forms of quality assessment by an extended
number of parties: by other scholars, both from my own field and from other neigh-
bouring fields, by various university administrations and committees, by the review
boards of various national and international research funding agencies and institu-
tions, as well as by various assessment boards of the federal state and on the national
level. Last, but not least, I have also been asked numerous times to assess myself not
by mere introspection, but in a more regulated and prescribed form.
Ever since my performance as a scholar became the subject of a standardized
questionnaire for the first time in 1984 at a leading American university, quality
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assessment in all its different forms has remained an inescapable part of my scholarly
and professional existence.
From this perspective of personal experience as an individual scholar, my feelings
towards the continuous increase of assessment processes, the growing repertoire of
procedures and protocols, as well as in face of the various institutional and public
ratings and rankings in which they result—my sentiments in regard to all this exces-
sive monitoring and controlling could best be described by quoting Elvis Costello:
‘I used to be disgusted, now I’m trying to be amused.’
To put it a bit more precisely; even though over the last decades I have come
to experience and somewhat grudgingly accept an astounding number of forms of
quality assessment and rating processes in the humanities as inescapable, that does
not in any way mean I deem them indispensable. On the contrary, as an individual
scholar in the humanities, I have increasingly come to doubt and, in fact, severely
question both the essential necessity and the positive effect of quantifying ratings and
rankings in and for the specific form of research that is being done in the humanities.
To put it bluntly: I find it rather hard, if not impossible, to conceive of any process of
calculating and expressing in numbers the difference in quality in regard to research in
my field that would actually have any impact other than to regulate it (mainstreaming
it, prescribing it) by rather artificial measures of comparison.
Thus, the only thing I learned so far from the ongoing and increasing assessment
and quantification of research quality in the humanities is this: Whatever can be
quantified, will be quantified—and if it hasn’t been quantified yet, it will be quantified
eventually. So I agree with my colleague Klaus Stierstorfer that if ratings and rankings
are here to stay there is hardly a way to avoid them—but that doesn’t make them
more useful or attractive.
As Werner Plumpe, the president of the Association of German Historians has
recently argued with considerable gloom, the sheer pressure of and rush towards rat-
ings and rankings may eventually even reach the unquantifiable soul of the human-
ities: enforcing quantifying methods on central dimensions of research that cannot
and should not be measured and expressed by numerical values only.
There are good reasons to accept some of the more convincing arguments that
Plumpe brings forth against rating and ranking procedures in the humanities based on
quantification, and I easily agree with most of his criticism and scepticism in regard to
the uselessness of quantification for the acknowledgement and assessment of research
quality in the humanities. There may also be good reason to subscribe to Plumpe’s
skepticism that there is a great danger of misinterpretation, or even misuse by third
parties, resulting from the suggestive comparability of mere numerical values—
something that must be seen as a central concern given the fact that all these numerical
values are (increasingly) used as evidence and arguments for the distribution of
resources by universities, by the state (both on the federal and the national level) and
by third party sponsors like research foundations (both national and international).
And yet there is something slightly uncomfortable and counterintuitive in this
well-stated arguments, and even though I share both the reasoning and the sentiment
to a certain degree, eventually the conclusions I draw from the current situation are
rather different.
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In fact, while Plumpe (and the majority of his colleagues in the association
of German historians) have emphatically decided not to take part in the prepara-
tory study initiated by the Deutscher Wissenschaftsrat (German Science Council),
the Deutscher Anglistenverband (German Association for English Studies) and the
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien (German Association for American Stud-
ies) have decided to do just that—despite the fact that we share the fundamental
scepticism of our colleagues from the history departments about essential aspects of
rating and ranking in the humanities per se.
But there are several reasons for this decision, and some of them have already been
presented in summarized form by Klaus Stierstorfer. My task in the following parts
of these short remarks will be to describe the specific perspective of the association
which I represent in respect to the projected study but also in general. This perspective
is particularly characterized by the strong interdisciplinary traits of the research that
is being done in German American Studies (or more precisely Amerikaforschung).
I said there is something counterintuitive or uncomfortable about the complete
rejection of the quantification of research quality in the humanities. While there are,
as I readily acknowledged, good arguments against quantification as such, these argu-
ments should not (and probably cannot) obscure our perception of the high degree
of assessment by quantification that is already in practice in the humanities—in fact,
one could argue that it is quantification which dominates the assessment of individual
research in the humanities from the very start until the moment when one has suc-
cessfully become installed by a committee—on the basis of other assessments—as
a university professor. In other words, the professional success in the academic field
of the humanities is essentially based on ratings and rankings and other accepted
assessment procedures within the field. While these procedures are of course not
completely based on or expressed in numbers, one cannot overlook or deny the
existence and significance of quantification within these assessment practices in the
humanities.
This is not meant to be a rhetorical move—I don’t think that my colleagues
from the history departments would deny the existence of quantification and ranking
procedures within their field and as part of their own daily academic practice. Yet
while they would readily attest this, they would probably also insist that all this rating
and ranking is only done by peers, and based on meticulous and highly reflected
methods of reviewing and critical acknowledgment.
However, if there are procedures of assessment involving quantification estab-
lished in the field as such, it is obvious that the argument against quantification in
the humanities is either a universal one—then it either works or it doesn’t; and if
it does not work because it can never capture the ‘soul’ that is the real quality of
research done in the humanities, then one should drop it altogether: no more grading
of research papers, no more graded forms of assessment for doctoral theses on a stan-
dard scale (even when using the Latin terms this is still a quantification of quality),
no more ranking lists in committees etc.
On the other hand, if the argument is not a universal one (and I don’t think it is
or can be) then the debate should not be about quantification at all, but, rather about
consensual standards of comparison and accepted and/or acceptable conditions of
‘21 Grams’: Interdisciplinarity and the Assessment of Quality in the Humanities 217
assessment which make the quantified expression of quality not only possible but
even desirable for pragmatic reasons (and a number of factors have been named
already during our discussions: the sheer increase of scholarship and its ever grow-
ing diversity, international competition and funding schemes within the common
European research area etc.).
Another aspect that also tends to be neglected in the debate (and I am only talking
about the debate about the pros and cons of assessment and quantification of research
quality) is the increasing development of new transnational research and study pro-
grams, especially on the young researchers level, i.e. joint doctoral programs within
the humanities offered and designed by institutions from different countries across
Europe. One of the most challenging tasks is to find a common denominator for the
assessment and control of the quality of the study programme and the research of
the individual researcher. The same is true for international research consortia: there
has to be a shared understanding of the quality standards that would guide and make
possible the assessment of the research to be conducted. This is an aspect that is of
special significance for American Studies as a discipline and a field of research, since
in contrast to English Studies (Anglistik), American studies has been conceived from
the start as a fundamentally interdisciplinary enterprise. In fact, one could argue that
American Studies is the name for research done across the boundaries of various dis-
ciplines and since its inception this understanding has always led to intense struggles
about the proper methodologies, the common concepts, the shared terminology and,
last but not least, the commonly accepted standards of quality in research between
all participating disciplines.
Therefore, from the perspective of the scientific community involved in research
in American Studies in Germany, the participation in the proposed pilot study by
the Science Council has both professional, strategic and pragmatic reasons. On the
one hand, it presents a calculated step to maintain a central role in the debate and
definition of standard criteria and procedures to assess the quality of research done
within the discipline. At the same time, it acknowledges the increasing dynamics of
collaborative research agendas across disciplines and across national research areas,
which are at the heart of the current struggles for standards, criteria and indicators
that may be transferable and commonly acceptable at the same time.
In conclusion, one could summarize the motivational aspects that has guided the
decision of the DGfA as follows:
• To assure the active participation and indispensable involvement of the field/
scientific community in the process of defining standards and criteria of assessment
for the quality of research within the field
• To allow for an open and ongoing debate about standards and criteria within the
field and across the disciplines ⇒ interdisciplinary research community
• To actively take on responsibility for the development of common standards and
criteria
• To make transparent and critically debate existing standards
• To develop common consensual standards across disciplines that meet the require-
ments and the dynamics of today’s interdisciplinary research in the humanities
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Let me end with a caveat: The process certainly is not an easy one, and we do not
think that we should drop our guard by replacing our healthy scepticism with a naïve
trust in the evidence of numbers and graphs. As has been emphasized, the process of
arriving at the shared and commonly accepted standards and criteria I talked about
can only be a mixture of top-down and bottom-up approaches and perspectives. To
return to my initial historical anecdote: Weighing the ‘soul’ of the humanities should
not simply be translated into a question of grams and ounces, nor should the wealth
and diversity of humanities research be assessed as a quantité negligeable.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 2.5 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/) which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s)
and source are credited.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or
reproduce the material.
